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A DISPOSITION TRIBUNAL
NATHANIEL CANTOR'

The Individualization of Treatment
If the prevention of crime is the aim of penal treatment then
the method of treatment must necessarily be selected in light of the
individual delinquent. The immediate aim of treating the individual offender is the means to the more mediate aim of protecting
society. The deterrent effects of the particular method (and mode)
of treatment selected for an individual offender become of secondary
importance. If reformation within an institution is the method
chosen, the fact of incarceration and deprivation of liberty itself
probably carries.a deterrent effect. If non-institutional modes of
reform are attempted the deterrent effect upon others may be
lessened but the possibilities of reforming the delinquent may be
increased.
Greater reliance is being placed upon the method of re-forming
criminal. The assumption is made that a program of
individual
the
a reduction in the amount of crime, and, hence,
promises
reform
It is supposed that through education and
security.
increased social
law abiding. This supposition has
become
can
training offenders
are relatively few penal instituThere
as yet not been justified.
reformative program.
genuinely
tions which have incorporated a
per cent of the
ninety-five
The fact remains, however, that over
will return
prisons
and
inmates of all federal and state reformatories
two to
from
to society at the expiration of an average sentence
more
that
three years. The records in recent years have revealed
felonies.
than a majority of the released inmates will commit further
Whether or not the punitive spirit of the prisons is responsible for
this rate of recidivism one may conclude that the non-reformative
methods employed have not deterred the former prisoners. One
may argue that the prisons have not failed. They certainly have
not succeeded in the majority of cases.
Punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation have been tried as
major aims of penal treatment. What the general deterrent effect
upon the potential criminal has been is simply not known. That
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such methods of treatment have not been successful in restraining
more than half of the released prisoners is demonstrably clear. As
a practical matter reformative schemes should be tried. The solid
knowledge, gleaned from the psychological and social sciences, is
pitifully meagre. But what we do know about the process of personality development suggests that constant repression leads to distortion and maladjustment and that kindly "guidance," encouragement and "socially approved self-expression" lead to more normal
behavior.
The employment of reformative modes of treatment will necessarily depend upon the needs of the individual. But if the requirements of the individual prisoner are the basic criteria in the
treatment program far reaching changes will have to be made in
the administration of justice. The individualization of treatment
shifts the emphasis from the crime, which traditionally has occupied the central position in the law, to the criminal. The individual
offender, his backgrounds and his needs, become pivotal in the
criminal law and in the administration of justice.
If the classical views of matching severity of offense with
severity of punishment (for retribution or deterrence) are surrendered for the modern purpose of reforming the offender the
criminal law must be radically altered. We now turn to some of
the major alterations required by the shift in emphasis from the
crime to the criminal.
The Disposition Tribunal2
The proceedings involved in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of a defendant must be differentiated from the disposition
proceedings. The methods of ascertaining the facts and the purpose
thereof are different for the determination of guilt and the imposition of sentence. The average judge is legally trained. His function is to preside at a criminal proceedings and to see that the rules
of criminal procedure which govern the conduct of the trial are
not violated. His training and experience have been in the direction
of analyzing legal elements, in sifting relevant evidence, in ruling
up6n" questions of law, in charging the jury -as to the law.
The task of determining what should be done with the offender
is simplified by the criminal law which provides the "appropriate"
sentence for the specific crime. In order to know what to do with
2 Anyone interested in this idea should read Warner and Cabot, Judges and
Law Reform, 1936.
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the offender the judge need but turn to the proper section of the
criminal code. An example of what will be found is the following:
Offence

State

Statutory Punishment

Burglary, first degree

Illinois
Texas

Minimum- 1 year
"
2 years

Rape,

"

"

New York
Texas

"
"

1 year
15 years

Forgery,

"

"

Washington
Missouri

"
"

6 months
10 years

Assault,

"

"

Washington
Missouri

"
"

5 years
2 years

Some criminal codes, however, grant the courts wide discretion
in determining what sentence to impose. What factors determine
the exercise of that discretion? There is no way of finding out.
With relatively few exceptions there are no written opinions explaining the choice the sentence imposed. However, by comparing
the type of sentence imposed for similar offenses by different judges
in the same state (or city) some insight is obtained into the parlous
state of judicial discretion.
In the district courts of Boston in 1934 wide variation in sentences was observed. The Boston Municipal Court fined slightly over
two per cent of the defendants convicted of drunkenness and sentenced over forty-eight per cent to jail. The West Roxbury Court
fined nearly thirty-four per cent and the Brighton Court imposed
jail sentences upon a little over six per cent. Over forty-five per
cent of the defendants were placed on probation in the Brighton
Court but only fifteen per cent in the Charlestown Court. In the
Roxbury court less than five per cent of the defendants convicted
of (chiefly) larceny and burglary are fined whereas twenty-four
per cent of the defendants convicted of these crimes receive fines
in South Boston.
The arbitrary and even capricious imposition of sentences is
matched by the utter failure of the courts to recognize abnormal
criminals. The clear cut cases of insanity are easily recognized and
the offender is sent to an institution for the criminally insane. But
the larger number of offenders afflicted with more subtle forms of
mental abnormalities, including the different psychoses, remain
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I.

Per Cent Distribution of probation or suspended sentence, with supervision of defendants found guilty by trial courts, by offence and by
states. (This reconstructed table is based upon the tables appearing on
pp. 81-82 of Judicial Criminal Statistics. 1934.)

State

Larceny Embezzlement
Except
AggraManslaugh- Rob- vated Bur- Auto Auto and ForMurder ter bery Assault glary Theft Theft Fraud gery

Ohio .............. 11.8
0.8
Pennsylvania .....
California ...........

....
15.3
30.3

Connecticut ...... ....
District Columbia ..........
Kansas ............ ...
Michigan ............
Minnesota ............

....
....
....
....

22.8
13.9
13.6

32.5
24.4
3.6

37.7
20.4
34.4

40.4
28.4
32.0

49.4
27.0
43.4

38.6
23.2
34.6

Rape

48.5
20.1
39.7

12.8
9.2
30.4

6.3

....

29.0

29.0

....

....

....

....

14.4

22.5

23.8

33.7

43.5

....

....

....

3.1
11.3
5.3

....
....
....

12.9
41.7
33.2

10.8" 11.9
40.3 48.3
20.6 41.7

12.9
37.8
46.5
21.3
18.8
17.8
26.8
25.8
21.8
17.0
15.7
11.1

12.5
46.1
22.9
....
20.1
18.0
23.0
22.2
....
13.8
....
12.0

4.7 11.9
....
Missouri .............
New Jersey .......... .... 11.7 29.3
Wisconsin ................ 10.9 20.1
Arizona ........... .... .......... ....
Colorado .......... .... .......... ....
Iowa .............. ... .......... ....
Oregon ............ ... .......... ....
Nebraska ...........................
New Hampshire ............ .........
South Dakota ................... ....
M ontana .......... .... ..... .........
Washington ................ .........

12.7
43.1
46.7
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....

23.5
....
..........
....
27.8

24.8
....

10.9
46.2
17.7
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....

....
27.6
45.1
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....

8.9
....
60.1
....
....
....
....
....
.....
....
....
....

II.

If we select the state using probation least often and most often
for the same offence we obtain the following data.
Offence

High
State

Per Cent on Low
Probation State

Ohio
Robbery
Ohio
Aggravated Assault
Wisconsin
Burglary
New Jersey
Larceny
Ohio
Autp theft
Embezzlement and fraud New Jersey
Wisconsin
Forgery
Wisconsin
Rape

22.8
32.5
46.5
46.1
49.4
46.2
60.1
45.1

.

PerCent on
Probation

Kansas
California
Washington
Kansas
Kansas
Missouri
Missouri
Pennsylvania

3.1
3.6
11.1
10.8
11.9
10.9
8.9
9.2
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III.

State

Probation or
suspendedsentence
with supervision

Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Dist. of Col.

Probationor
Fines,
suspended sentence
costs or other
without supervision money payment only

24.2
33.8
16.7
- 13.7
26.9__

9.0
2.5
0.3
7.7

18.1

0.9

9.9

17.5
14.8
31.9
22.0
14.4
12.7
27.4
15.0
37.0
13.7
9.5,
.32.9
21.9
22.4
19.3
10.8
13.1
10.7
13.5

4.0
1.6
1.8
2.5
1.1
3.0
2.5
25.3
6.4
14.9
4.0
1.9
9.7
3.0
4.5
6.1
1.5
14.6
7.1

15.8
5.6
17.4
8.7
13.7
7.7
12.6
18.7
10.9
11.7
10.0
12.2
11.6
29.3
15.3
7.6
6.7
49.3
4.1

Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

6.2
5.0
3.7
16.2
2.1

unrecognized as they pass through the courts. They are sent to the
wrong institutions or placed on probation or fined and in most cases
do not receive the attention necessary for their possible adjustment
-or incapacitation.
The average lawyer-judge is not prepared and should not be
expected to individualize treatment. Where he is given discretion
it is exercised haphazardly, in terms of the seriousness of the crime,
the moral climate of the community, and personal bias.
If the purpose of treatment is to prevent crime by incapacitation
or reformation of the individual offender the problem of who shall
be incapacitated or reformed must be left to those qualified in diagnosing human nature and conduct. "Behavior experts" are not
magicians. They can't turn gunmen into choir-sopranos. But they
are more qualified than the average lay judge in evaluating and
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interpreting the play of physiological, psychological, and sociological
factors in the lives of men. Physicians, social workers, psychologists,
psychiatrists are trained in definite techniques. They obtain clinical
experience. Through their major activity, over a period of time,
they acquire insights into the complexities of character formation
and personality growth.
'The conclusion is inevitable, for most students of this problem,
that the determination of guilt should be left to the courts and that
the determination of the sentence should be placed in the hands of
a disposition tribunal.
The personnel of such tribunal should consist of lawyers and
non-lawyers. A judge should be a member. His function would
consist of directing the procedure .in accordance with the statute
defining the power and function of the tribunal. A second member
might be the trial judge. His opinion and impressions of the defendant and evidence would be valuable. He, too, gains insight
over a period of years on the bench. The other three members (or
other two if the tribunal be limited to three) should represent the
fields of psychology, psychiatry, social work and criminology.
Its task would be to "diagnose" the entire situation, to examine
the personality of the offender, his backgrounds, his relative danger
to social interests, the possibilities of his reform and to determine
the method of treatment. Its decision and reasons therefor should
be formulated in writing.
Provision would have to be made for periodic reports of the
progress of the offender and for his reexamination. At once the
need for cooperation with the probation, parole and prison administration is recognized. The disposition tribunal would be represented in every treatment agency.
Wherever wide discretion is given the danger of abuse exists.
Therefore, an administrative board such as a disposition tribunal
carries the risk of arbitrariness in determining the type and length
of treatment. The rights and liberties of -the offender must be safeguarded. The statute conferring jurisdiction upon the tribunal
would have to be carefully drawn delimiting its power. It would
have to be broad enough to confer discretion without at the same
time placing the offender at the complete mercy of erring human
beings. This might be accomplished through the statute defining
the categories under which the offender falls or specifying the exact
procedure to be followed by the disposition tribunal.
Provision for an appellate tribunal would act as a restraining
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influence upon the decisions of the disposition tribunal. It would
compel the latter to be responsible for its conclusions and to be
ready to produce the written record in support of them. It would
reassure the public that men's liberties are still protected by law
rather than by men.'
The records of the disposition tribunal after a period of years
can be compared with the results. The treatments recommended
and the later careers of the offenders subjected to them will indicate the effect of various forms of treatment on different inmates.
Mistakes will be observed and corrected. In time the sentencing of
offenders will be based upon what has been learned from the past
iecord of recommendations and results.
A disposition tribunal seriously concerned with individualizing
treatment would indirectly effect changes in the criminal law.
There would no longer be any point in maintaining distinctions
between the degrees of an offense, attempts to. commit crimes and
the actual crimes, or providing in advance specific punishments for
specific crimes.
What cases should be referred to the disposition tribunal?
Obviously minor offenders, those violating city or police ordinances
should be excluded. "Cafeteria courts" meet such problems. At
the other extreme, i. e., in murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery,
the public, at its present stage of opinion, simply would not support
a disposition tribunal. Perhaps, then, the crimes which, in the
several states, arouse the deepest indignation and resentment should
also be excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The public
generally is sympathetic to the juvenile delinquency courts. The
disposition tribunal in intent and procedure is akin to the juvenile
delinquency proceedings. The latter courts have jurisdiction of
those up to sixteen or eighteen years of age or so. By placing
those up to twenty-five years of age under the jurisdiction of the
disposition tribunal the age to which juvenile delinquency proceedings apply would be merely raised. Furthermore, the disposition tribunal would thus handle not only the age class committing
the largest number of crimes but the type of offenders who next to
juvenile delinquents are probably most amenable to treatment.
The Indeterminate Sentence
A disposition tribunal would be interested in protecting society
3Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 165.
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by reforming types of individuals who appear reformable, and in
incapacitating those who appeared incorrigible. In the absence of
knowledge diagnoses may be unsound and society unprotected.
Hence, the safeguard of an absolute indeterminate sentence. Society
must not be asked to assume the risks involved in the judgments of
"behavior experts," but at the same time their opinions as to incorrigibility must not remove the possibilities of reform. The judgment
of the disposition tribunal would be an hypothesis-a wise guess, a
guess more soundly informed than the irresponsible conclusions of
the courts, the uninformed opinions of district attorneys, and the
senseless punishment provisions of the criminal codes.
The tentative disposition of cases by the tribunal would, be
subjected to the test of experience. .What, in fact, so far as the facts
are ascertainable, happens to the inmate? If the judgment of the
tribunal should be unsound it could be modified.
Furthermore, inmates may learn to understand that their own
behavior and not the type of crime is the primary factor determining
the disposition of their case or the length of their stay. There will
no longer be an average sentence for a specific offense, so much
"time" for this and so much "time" for that crime. The suspicion of
graft and the resentment againsi politics underlying the disparity in
terms of inmates will possibly be removed-if the disposition tribunal is unimpeachable in character and scrupulous in their work.
Such understanding will have a salutary effect on inmate morale
and prison discipline.
Parole boards would function under authority delegated to
them by the Disposition Tribunal and their recommendations would
be subject to the approval of the tribunal. The parole boards would
also have the precommitment data of the individual gathered by
ihe Tribunal authorities. It is reasonable to suppose that the parole
board.as an agent of the Disposition Tribunal and answerable to it
would be more careful in its analysis and less arbitrary in its judgment. The net result would probably be greater respect for its
function on the part of the inmate and improved methods in and
standards for determining release.
" There are several chief objections raised to the absolute
indeterminate sentence:
(a)
The deterrence of potential criminals as well as the reformation of the inmate should be considered. There is evidence to
show that the average period of imprisonment under the minimummaximum sentence is decidedly less than under the determinate

A DISPOSITION TRIBUNAL

sentence. It is extremely probable that under an absolute indeterminate sentence periods of confinement will be longer for the
"hardened" criminals as well as for many misdemeanants who re-ceive sentences of 5 or 10 or 30 days four, fourteen or forty times.
The deterrent effects of an absolute indeterminate sentence upon
potential offenders would certainly be as great if not more effective
than the present definite or minimum-maximum sentences.
(b) It is asserted that a completely indeterminate sentence
would create hypocrisy among inmates, that they would conform
externally to rules and regulations only to create a favorable impression upon prison officials so as to better their chances for release.
This situation is no less true under a minimum-maximum sentence.
(c) It is maintained that an absolute indeterminate sentence
is unworkable because the system requires well trained guards, nonpolitical and extremely well qualified parole board members, and,
above all, it is unworkable because there are no sound criteria for
determining when an inmate is reformed and ready for release. The
rejoinder is obvious. Poorly trained guards, corrupt and inefficient
parole boards cannot be expected to determine wisely the time of
release under a minimum-maximum sentence especially in the absence of sound criteria and when the bare facts of the formal prison
record are the chief source of information.
In short, over ninety-five per cent of prisoners are released
sooner or later and return to society. Some agency must determine
when they are to be released.
At present the legislature fixes in advance either a definite term
for specific crimes or sets the minimum-maximum terms within
which the courts may exercise discretion. Matching offenses with
sentences is directly connected with a retributive attitude and may
be related to deterrence. It has little, if anything, to do with reforming offenders. The discretion permitted the courts in the minimum-maximum sentences, i. e., judicial individualization, is exercised haphazardly, inefficiently, or mechanically by legislative prescription.
"Scientific" individualization is the remaining alternative." To
be sure, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. But it is not quite"
so dangerous as a great deal of ignorance. No careful student has
ever declared that human behavior is clearly understood. All that
the scrupulous social scientist maintains is that there is a body of
data and a series of techniques which promise measurably to reduce
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the tragic and scandalous errors involved in the current masstreatment of disposing of offenders.
Treatment and Law
Criminologists, psychiatrists and social workers who argue that
the criminal act should be ignored and attention focussed only upon
the individual criminal fail to sense the risk of personal security
involved in that position. The positivists, I believe, are sound in
the contention that the personality of the offender and his "social
dangerousness" are important elements which should be considered.
Complete abandonment of the rule nullum crimen sine lege would
expose individuals to the whims of the court, city and state officials
who identify themselves with the law and to the political currents
of the day. The stability of social order and the security of person
may be more important than repressing individuals considered to be
socially dangerous by judges whose discretion is not bound by legislation defining specific crime. There is no guarantee that we will
agree with the judges on what constitutes socially dangerous acts
nor upon the standards used to identify socially dangerous individuals. The criminal law needs overhauling. Its basic assumptions
need to be re-examined. Wider and perhaps narrower categories
of crime need to be defined. Above all, we must not abandon the
law. No people is safe unless rules of law limit the judgments of
men.
The changes in our knowledge of character and conduct have
shifted emphasis from the crime to the criminal. This shift challenges the maxim "no punishment without specific laws." The
contributions of modern science to progressive penal ideas of treatment cannot be ignored. But treatment should not depend exclusively upon the personality of the offender any more than correction should depend upon the anti-social nature of the act or
social dangerousness of the individual. Just as specific criminal
legislation protects us against the arbitrariness in the administration
of the law on the side of content, so our being subjected to treatment
should be protected through legislation by clearly defining the limits
within which various forms of treatment may be imposed. Otherwise the individualization of treatment can come to mean that anything can be done to anyone convicted of a crime.
It does not follow that the other extreme of the classical school
should be supported; namely, that for every crime there should be
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a specific punishment. The development of the indeterminate and
suspended sentence, the reduction of pleas, probation, parole and
"good time" laws indicate how far we have gone in modifying the
classical view of similar punishments for similar offenses. We know
now that such view which removed discretion from the judges did
not make for fair and uniform justice in any real sense. Indeed we
want to return the discretion to the courts or a disposition tribunal
which Beccaria urged be taken away. We wish to treat the individual and not to punish the crime. We hope that the discretion
given the sentencing agency will be exercised "soundly," in light
of the "best" available knowledge. There is no guarantee, however,
that sentencing boards will possess wisdom nor that there will be
agreement on what knowledge is "best." Individualization of treatment can lead to concentration camps as well as to psychiatric
therapy.
It is not a question of opposing rigid legal, rules against enlightened discretion, but of relating law and discretion to each other.
There can be no final answer given through logic alone. The limits,
areas and techniques of discretion and rule must be empirically discovered through cautious and courageous change.

